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1912-1940
Abstract: This study reexamines the accounting profession's
response to opportunities and incentives given it during
three unique periods in its history to foster reliable
accounting, reporting and auditing practices. By profession,
we mean the auditors of publicly held companies as
represented by the American Institute of Accountants and
its predecessor, the American Association of Public
Accountants (AAPA).
We use two models of
professionalism, the Functionalist and the Conflict models,
to interpret the profession's response to these events. We
find that both self interest and the public interest may have
motivated many of the actions taken. These motivations are
not, however, mutually exclusive and both may be used to
interpret the same behavior.
INTRODUCTION
The accounting profession in the United States developed into its
modern form by 1940. The American Institute of Accountants (AIA)
was the national organization of accountants. A code of ethics was in
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place and the AIA had disciplinary authority over its members based on
that code. The AIA's Committee on Accounting Procedure, forerunner
to the Accounting Principles Board and later the Financial Accounting
Standards Board, was responsible for setting accounting standards,
albeit not mandatory at the time. A workable, sometimes uneasy,
relationship existed between the profession and the Securities and
Exchange Commission. The state societies had licensing control over
new CPAs, setting educational and experiential requirements, although
most used the national examination written by the AIA [Miranti, 1990].
Annual audits of publicly traded companies were legally mandatory.
At the beginning of the century, little of this was in place. There was
no national organization of accountants of any size or influence [Previts
and Merino, 1979]. The first state licensing legislation was passed in
New York in 1896. Other states followed but licensing requirements
varied, ranging from substantial experience, educational and examination
requirements to virtually none. The minimal amount of regulation over
accounting and auditing practice may be explained by the relative
simplicity of accounting and a fairly small securities market.
An explosion of mergers and consolidations at the beginning of the
twentieth century accelerated the growth of accountancy. Knowledgeable
and competent accountants were needed to handle these complex
accounting transactions and the status of the fledgling discipline began
to rise [Littleton and Zimmerman, 1962; and Previts and Merino, 1979].
Growing companies and expanding manufacturing industries also needed
accountants to set up financial and cost accounting systems. With the
later passage of tax legislation, accountants carved out a permanent
place for their skills in the tax area.
Until the passage of the Securities Acts, public corporations faced
little independent oversight. Audits were largely voluntary despite
spreading public ownership of stock although companies increasingly
engaged auditors to attest to their annual financial reports [Merino et al,
1994]. A large portion of audit work prior to 1920 was the balance sheet
audit attesting to a company's collateral and liquidity to satisfy bankers
who supplied most corporate financing [Chatfield, 1974]. Companies
sometimes requested auditing services for their own information
[Miranti, 1990]. The auditor's role was therefore strikingly different
from that of today. Francis Pixby, at the 1904 World Congress of
Accountants, said that the auditor's duty was to the company not to
stockholders [Previts and Merino, 1979, p. 180]. In 1933, the accounting
firm Seidman and Seidman wrote that neither audits nor financial reports
were for the benefit of stockholders [Letter, 4/6/33]. Many prominent
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol24/iss2/4
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people, including accounting practitioners and academics, criticized
audited financial statements as unreliable for investment decisions
[Smith, 1912; Kohler, 1926 & 1932; Berle, 1926; Hatfield, 1927;
Ripley, 1927; Couchman, 1928; Robbins, 1929; Farr, 1933; Pecora,
1939]. Management could choose from a variety of alternative practices
and valuation methods without disclosure and could count on the support
of their auditors. Changes of method were not reported. Despite
criticism, the business sector was not interested in promoting a stringent
monitoring system over their activities and were indignant at the
suggestion. "Every businessman used his own accounting principles and
fought like hell to sustain them" [Previts and Merino, 1979, p. 219].
The voluntary nature of the audit, the absence of authoritative
accounting rules, and the weakness of auditors worked against the
presentation of financial statements in accordance with accounting
conventions considered to be sound according to textbooks and other
guides of the time [Montgomery, 1926].
So long as the discontinuance of audits or change of auditors
passes without comment from stockholders or creditors, the
auditors are hampered in their efforts to make accounts as
accurate and their certificates as complete and informative as
possible. If auditors take too rigid a stand the directors will
simply publish unaudited accounts or perhaps seek some more
amenable auditors [May, 1915, p. 251]
Twenty years later, Littleton [1935, p. 285-6] believed little had
changed: "(Q)ualified to serve these men may be, but free to serve with
a real independence they are not... When their powers of persuasion are
exhausted, auditors have but little choice except acquiescing or
resigning."
PURPOSE
This study examines the accounting profession's response to
opportunities and incentives given it during three unique periods in its
history to foster reliable accounting, reporting and auditing practices. By
profession, we mean the auditors of publicly held companies as
represented by the AIA and its predecessor, the American Association of
Public Accountants (AAPA). We use original correspondence between
the AIA, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and other published
materials as evidence.
Published by eGrove, 1997
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The profession's responses to these opportunities for change may
have been motivated by self interest rather than by protection of the
public interest as suggested by the rhetoric of the time and by some
modern historians. Wootton and Wolk [1992], for example, offer a
nonproblematic account of the development of the accounting profession
that obscures the profession's battles to preserve its independence and
extend its power.
EVENTS TO BE DISCUSSED
Three extended events in the profession's history provide the focus
for this discussion. The first event is the reaction of the profession to the
demands and regulatory threats posed by bankers, the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) and the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) from around
1912 to 1917. The second is the collaboration between the NYSE and
the AIA as they worked to improve reporting practice in the face of
impending regulation in the early 1930s. The third is the response of the
profession to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) from
1934-1939. All three events threatened accountancy's professional
identity. Two models of professionalism are used to interpret the
profession's actions.
APPROACH USED TO ANALYZE THE EVENTS
The functionalist and the conflict models of professionalism
[Kultgen, 1988] help interpret the actions of accounting's emerging
leadership within the AIA. Sociologists have used both models to study
professions [e.g. Durkheim, 1957; Collins, 1979] and Hooks (1992)
applied similar models in her analysis of events occurring more recently
in accounting history.
The functionalist model explains and predicts the behavior or
characteristics of either an individual or a group but it is group activities
that are of particular interest in this research. The primary assumption
of this model is that the profession is devoted to the public interest, to
human welfare. The service offered is important and complex requiring
extensive education, training, experience and a commitment to lifetime
learning. However, mastery of technical skills is not enough. The
professional must develop and exercise judgement because client needs
are highly individual and not amenable to textbook solutions. The
complexity of these efforts means that only a professional can assess the
quality of the work performed by another (Kultgen, 1988, p. 79, 81, 91,
95).
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol24/iss2/4
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Professional groups form to ensure quality. They determine what
technical skills are needed, set standards for admission to the profession,
provide opportunities for continual education and monitor the work of
members through peer review and investigations of complaints. They
write codes of conduct that describe the behaviors professionals should
exhibit in their work and toward clients and other professionals. The
desire to preserve quality leads the group to lobby for licensure to
prevent the unqualified from practicing and harming the public (Kultgen,
1988, p. 74, 85).
Society gives the profession a license and a monopoly over practice
because it values the service and believes that this will help the
profession ensure high quality performance. Sustaining high quality is
the duty of a profession that wishes to maintain its license, but it is also
its desire so it willingly engages in self-monitoring activities. The
benefits of monopoly are status and high fees but these are secondary to
the rewards derived from a love of work and a desire to help others. The
professional is judged therefore, not by the fees commanded but by the
quality of the service provided (Kultgen, 1988, p. 84, 85, 95).
The conflict model, which focuses on group behavior, assumes that
self interest is the dominant motivation of a profession whose purpose it
is to monopolize control over practice to secure status, power and
economic gain. It predicts that practitioners will organize and, as a
group, position themselves as a profession to secure the benefits of
monopoly.
Organizing, unrelenting promotion of the value and need of their
services, writing a code of conduct and setting standards for admission
are actions taken to convince those in power that a profession deserving
a license is in place and, once acquired, that it deserves to keep it. Codes
of conduct may be unenforceable and disciplinary mechanisms weak, but
the group can point to them as evidence of their concern with the public
welfare. Prohibitions of contingency fees, competitive bidding and
advertising serve to create a professional appearance but also protect the
elite professionals from losing market share to newcomers, even those
admitted to the professional group. Limiting access to the profession
through examination and other requirements is not motivated by public
welfare but by securing economic gain [Kultgen, 1988, p. 122, 123,
130].
Relationships with third parties are important. "The status of the
individual professional and the entire profession is tied to the status of
those served" [Kultgen, 1988, p. 128]. The social standing acquired from
proximity
to corporate
management or other influential groups, as well5
Published
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as the fees generated, limit the willingness of the profession to jeopardize
those relationships by imposing too restrictive standards of practice upon
them.
In conclusion, the key to both models is motivation. It is possible for
an action to be in the public interest while at the same time be an element
in the profession's negotiation for market power. Since motivation is
unobservable, and the models predict behaviors that are not mutually
exclusive, they may be used as alternative explanations for the same
events.
THE EVENTS AND INTERPRETATIONS OF THEM
Event 1: Bankers and Federal Agencies Demand Change
Bankers in the second decade of this century asked for improvements
in auditing and accounting. They accused small businesses in particular
of issuing misleading and unreliable financial statements out of either
ignorance or deceit without resistance from their auditors [Smith, 1912;
AIA Special Committee Reports, 1912-1914]. Bankers wanted certain
auditing procedures to be consistently and universally applied [AAPA,
Yearbook-1913:159ff] and offered to support the AAPA in its attempts
to standardize practice. Colley [1914] and Peple [1916], representatives
of the banking community, strongly supported the audit of financial
statements and expected auditors to examine carefully accounts
receivable and inventories not only for their numerical accuracy but for
their value.
Edward Hurley, chairman of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC),
supported these views. Hurley called for auditing instructions: "Which
would serve as a guide to accountants, bankers, credit men and the
business public...that...would at least show clearly the level below which
the accountant could not go and certify the alleged verity of the
accounts" [Editorial, 1929, p. 357]. He [1916] also recommended to the
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) that a federal audit
bureau check the credentials and reliability of audit practitioners who
wished to practice before the FRB and name those approved, zone
experts.
Hurley also favored uniform accounting, believing that it would
make financial statements easier to understand and comparable within an
industry. Uniform accounting meant an industry-wide chart of accounts,
a standard definition of what was to enter into those accounts and
uniform cost accounting standards. Many anticipated that cost
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol24/iss2/4
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accounting standards would end cutthroat competition believing that
businesses recklessly and ruinously cut prices because they did not know
their costs [Jordan and Harris, 1921; Dohr et al., 1935].
Cost accounting standards did not disturb financial accountants but
Hurley went further, he wanted to set rules for asset and liability
valuations. This appalled accountants who believed that such standards
would grossly misrepresent companies operating in different economic
environments. They worried that standardization would degrade the
profession to mere bookkeeping [Previts and Merino, 1979].
The 1915 -1917 Minutes of the AAPA and the AIA show that the
leadership resolved to deflect this potential regulation. To do so, they had
to demonstrate control over the level of competence of their own
practitioners. The AIA was formed (and the AAPA dissolved) in 1916
as a national organization of accountants. Practitioners could gain
admission and certification by passing a qualifying examination and
acquiring experience. The Institute elected a board of examiners,
published "Rules of Professional Conduct," and established a committee
on professional ethics to exercise disciplinary powers over the
membership.1
To meet the challenges to audit practice, the AIA gave the Federal
Reserve Board a document called Uniform Accounting which the Board
later published in the Federal Reserve Bulletin of 1917.2 While its title
and preface suggested that it standardized accounting methods, it did
not.3 The FRB reissued the document in 1918 under the title Approved
Methods for Preparation of Balance-Sheet Statements deleting all
references to uniform accounting. As a result of these actions, Hurley
dropped the idea of federal registration of accountants [Carey, 1969].

1

It is probably an exaggeration to assume that the FTC and FRB dropped
these proposals solely because of the efforts of the profession. The Wilson
presidential campaign and the entry of the U.S. into World War I necessarily
deflected the interests of the administration.
2

It was an adaptation of a Price Waterhouse internal control memorandum
that dealt with auditing procedures for small and medium-sized firms
[DeMond, 1951].
3

Both Chatov [1975] and Carey [1969] believe that the AIA took
advantage of Hurley's confusion over the difference between uniform
accounting
and1997
uniform auditing.
Published
by eGrove,
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Wootton and Wolk [1992, p. 6] claim that this document "hastened
the establishment of minimum auditing standards by many accounting
firms." In fact, Approved Methods reduced them [Merino et al. 1994].
It gave management an authoritative source with which to avoid
procedures that many thought were vital [Carey, 1969; Chatov, 1975;
Previts and Merino, 1979]. The auditor was to rely upon client assertions
for most asset-related information including inventories - despite bankers'
requests [Smith, 1912; Colley, 1914; Peple, 1916]. Approved Methods
[10] told auditors to confirm accounts receivable "if time permits and
clients do not object." Internal control evaluations were made optional
and large companies were largely exempt because good controls were
presumed to exist. Deference to management was made official.
Approved Methods recommended a short, standard audit certificate
despite banking community complaints that the short form audit report
conveyed little or no information about scope limitations or other
deficiencies of the audit process.4 The AIA maintained that a short form
report was less confusing than the longer, unstandardized report that
smaller audit firms preferred which often contained the audit procedures
followed and actions taken. The AIA claimed that the excessive verbiage
in these reports had at times concealed the absence of major auditing
procedures.
Functionalist Theory Interpretation of Event 1
Until this time, accountancy only loosely met the definition of a
profession. Under criticism by creditors and facing possible regulation
by Federal agencies, AIA welcomed these incentives to professionalize
practice as predicted by the functionalist model. It was unthinkable that
a government agency, ignorant of accounting, might determine who was
qualified. It should be noted that these were only first steps. The AIA
was weak. Although the leadership of the AIA was composed of partners
from the largest accounting firms, it did not represent the majority of
practicing accountants and, in fact, many resented the organization for
its elitism [Previts and Merino, 1979; Miranti, 1990].

The recommended report read as follows: "I have audited the accounts
of Blank and Co. for the period from
to
and I certify that the above
balance sheet and statement of profit and loss have been made in accordance
with the plan suggested and advised by the Federal Reserve Board and in my
opinion set forth the financial condition of the firm at
and the results of
its operations for the period" [Uniform Accounting, 24].
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol24/iss2/4
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Accounting knowledge had arrived at a level of complexity that
called for education and experience. In view of the complaints of
incompetency and collusion voiced by the banking community, and the
wide variations in certification requirements of the state bodies, the
AIA's board of examiners recommended that candidates for certification
complete a 'preliminary education' (a controversial requirement left
undefined), five years of experience (with exceptions) and an
examination. Certification would give the public assurance that these
practitioners possessed a level of competency upon which they could
rely, an assurance unavailable in some states where certification
standards were low. These controls may be construed as the first
attempts of the profession on a national basis to contract with the state
(represented by the FTC and FRB). In the long term, only licensure
would ensure that the profession could control the quality of the services
offered.
The AIA did not attempt to set accounting standards or to limit
management choices. The leadership placed a high premium on expert
judgement and expected the professional to oppose management only
rarely, using powers of persuasion. Since audits were voluntary, there
were few other options. There was no process in place where
practitioners might debate accounting practices and find consensus.
Given the AIA's lack of influence over a wide range of practitioners,
limitations on management choice would have to wait until power was
consolidated. Until then, the AIA could only begin to control the
qualifications of its own members, build their reputations and increase
the confidence of the public. As for auditing practice, the AIA again
relied heavily on professionalism. Approved Methods offered guidelines
but retained professional judgement as the preserve of the auditor who
alone could act in the interest of outside users.
Conflict Theory Interpretation of Event I
Many of the actions taken by the AIA may have been motivated by
self interest, as attempts to gain market control and limit audit practice.
The examination was controlled by an elite group and could restrict the
number of those admitted and the type of person admitted. Indeed, there
were many complaints [Previts and Merino, 1979; Miranti, 1990]. A
national organization could dislodge competitors and avoid competition.
By successfully negotiating with federal agencies, the profession not only
avoided regulation but gained status. Though not a true license, the
perception of AIA members as purveyors of higher quality service,
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would disadvantage those practicing outside of the purview of the
national organization.
The code of ethics prohibited advertising and competitive bidding.
While leading practitioners advanced compelling arguments in support
of the bans [Editorial, 1914 & 1915], smaller firms viewed them as
deliberate constraints on the expansion of their practices [Letter to the
Editor, 1914; Shorrock, 1914]. The code, while a symbol of professional
practice, functioned to preserve the market power of the elite firm.
Advocacy of a standardized short form report also worked to the
detriment of the small firm. Those desiring membership in the AIA were
barred from differentiating their services in a positive way. Byington and
Sutton [1991] said that buyers rely on brand names as a surrogate for
quality and recent research shows that a differentiation of quality is
perceived by buyers of auditing services between the Big 6 and non Big
6 firms. Indeed, banker J. Cannon wrote " . . . we strongly advocate and
prefer to buy the paper of those concerns whose accounts are audited by
established firms of accountants" [Colley, 1914, p. 425]. The AIA
effectively cut off most of the avenues available to the small firm to
attract audit clients.
Claims of specialized knowledge and expertise may mask a self
interest motivation. The profession cultivated the perception that they
possessed information difficult to acquire and reliably exercised and
monitored only by themselves. Educational requirements, examination
and an esoteric vocabulary perpetuated this notion. The idea that these
practices might be standardized was understandably anathema. If
accounting could be standardized then it was a technical discipline which
could be performed by anyone, threatening the emerging profession.
With the support of bankers and the federal agencies, the
accountancy profession might have made progress in setting accounting
and auditing standards. But the leadership resisted, arguing that uniform
accounting practices would mislead and that uniform auditing practices
would reduce audit practice to the lowest common denominator. Only the
experienced professional could understand the audit requirements of a
unique accounting system and pass on the appropriateness of the
accounting choices made [AAPA Yearbook, 1916]. If these functions
could be exercised by rote, then accountancy was not a profession.
Deference to corporate management maintained the profession's
relationship with those with whom there were social and financial
linkages. Claims that egregious practices would be dealt with in a period
when there were no authoritative standards can hardly be taken seriously.
Approved methods provided protection against liability by giving
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol24/iss2/4
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auditors a defense against non-performance of tasks and for reliance on
management.
Event 2: Collaboration of the ALA and the NYSE from 1931-1933
Although George O. May, representing the AIA, had established an
advisory relationship with the NYSE in 1927 (May, 1962), it was not
until it was clear that the depression was unlikely to abate and that the
public anger directed towards business was rising [Krooss, 1970] that
the Exchange awoke to the value of instituting change. Some form of
federal regulation over corporate reporting practices appeared imminent
[Kohler, 1934]. Hoxsey [1931, p. 2ff], executive assistant of the
Committee on Stock List of the NYSE, wrote to the AIA and warned
that "some form of regulation is inevitable. . . if we act now. . . we may
retard unwarranted intrusions."
The extant correspondence reveals that neither organization was
anxious to take the lead. Hoxsey [1931] asked the AIA's Special
Committee on Cooperation with Stock Exchanges5 to assume
responsibility for the suitability of management-selected accounting
principles and for a definition of full and fair disclosure. The AIA
responded that "the primary responsibility for selection of principles and
scope of disclosure must remain that of directors and officers of the
corporation" [AIA, 1931].
With income statement data becoming more and more important to
stockholders, Hoxsey asked auditors to insist that stockholders be
advised as to the sources of income, separately disclosing extraordinary
items, and to discourage management from using reserves to smooth
income. The AIA Committee replied that auditors lacked the power to
mandate such disclosures [Letter, 5/19/31].
The AIA Committee in turn [Letter, 9/22/32] asked the Exchange to
educate the public about the limitations of financial statements,
particularly their historical nature, to require that accounting methods be
disclosed and be consistently applied and that extraordinary items and
subsidiary income be segregated from ordinary income. They
recommended an annual audit and that every company adhere to five
broad principles of accounting which they believed were generally

5

The member of the committee included Archibald Bowman, Arthur
Carter, Charles Couchman, Samuel Leidesdorf, William Lybrand, and George
May—all representatives of major accounting firms.
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accepted (see Appendix). The Exchange accepted all of the Committee's
recommendations but one, disclosure of accounting methods. Whitney,
the president of the NYSE, wrote to the presidents of all listed companies
that financial statements issued in connection with listing applications
made after July 1, 1933 had to be audited. He added that, to serve as
useful safeguards for investors, "audits should be adequate in scope and
that the responsibility assumed by the auditor should be defined" [Letter,
1/31/33]. He asked all companies to secure from their auditors a letter
addressing most of the points made by the AIA's Committee:
1)

was the audit as extensive as that outlined by the
publication Verification of Financial Statements (VFS) (the
1929 revision of Approved Methods),

2)

had all subsidiaries been audited or their relative
importance to the parent company explained,

3)

had the auditors received all information requested,

4)

were the financial statements fairly presented,

5)

were accounting methods consistently applied and,

6)

did the methods used conform to accepted accounting
practices? (see Appendix.)

Nine major accountingfirmsjointly responded to the announcement.
Although supportive of the specific points outlined above, they wanted
to clarify the some of the limits of the audit engagement. They reiterated
[Letter, 2/24/33] that the guidelines outlined by VFS were not intended
to uncover fraud and that to do so would require an audit so expensive
as to outweigh any advantages. To avoid fraud, management was
responsible for establishing and maintaining an adequate system of
internal control. They reminded the Exchange that the auditor
traditionally focused on the balance sheet and would continue to do so,
guarding against overstatements of income not by extensive testing of
income accounts but by assuring the correctness of beginning and ending
balance sheets accounts. They reemphasized the importance of
consistency rather than uniformity of method. The audit report stated
that management's representations were reasonable, not all inclusive nor
necessarily optimal, in the auditor's view. The auditor could not replace
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol24/iss2/4
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his judgement for that of management and could only qualify the report
if the choices were very unsound.
Hoxsey was not satisfied by these circumscriptions of responsibility.
He insisted that auditors "should satisfy themselves that the system of
internal check provides adequate safeguards" and "accept the burden of
seeing that the income received and the expenditures made are properly
classified in so far as the facts are known to them" [Letter, 10/24/33]. He
also asked the AIA to develop a clearer and more informative auditor's
report.
The AIA found Hoxsey's income statement requests reasonable but
were careful in their response to the question of internal control [Letter,
12/21/33]. "It is always a matter of executive judgment to weigh the
risks against which safeguards are desirable against the cost of providing
safeguards." Claiming that accountants evaluated internal control as a
integral part of the audit, they cited VFS. "The scope of the work
indicated in these instructions includes. . . an examination of the
accounting system for the purpose of ascertaining the effectiveness of the
internal check." It is noteworthy that the adverb "incidentally" which
appears in VFS in place of the three dots is omitted in the letter to the
Exchange. The use of the word "incidentally" weakened the guidelines.
It suggested that checking controls was likely to happen during the
examination, but not that it must happen.
The liability that might rise out of the wording of the audit report
worried accounting firms. May sent a draft of a revised report to the
major firms for comment and received responses from Leidesdorf, from
Barrow, Wade and Guthrie, Haskins and Sells, and Peat, Marwick,
Mitchell. Leidesdorf [Letter, 11/17/33] wrote that the statement
"supplied with all the explanations and information which are necessary"
be replaced by "based on our examination and information furnished to
us." He warned that the former did not recognize the possibility that
management might have withheld information leaving all responsibility
with the auditor. Carter of Haskins and Sells [Letter, 11/24/33] wrote
that the report should clearly state the relationship between the auditor
and the client.
I refer particularly to the theory of relationship which holds the
client to be the author of the financial statements and regards
the accountant as the reviewer of such statements.. This position,
in addition to having possible legal value, is, as we have learned
. . . , an invaluable one when controversies arise with clients as
disclosures
Publishedtobythe
eGrove,
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The format of the standard unqualified audit report was finally approved
at the beginning of 1934 after considerable debate.
Functionalist Theory Interpretation of Event 2
Affiliation with the NYSE gave the leadership a rich opportunity to
serve the public. With the support of the NYSE, they could resolve some
of the major issues of accounting practice and presentation and begin a
process of expanding public knowledge. The leaders of the AIA knew
that some investors misunderstood the nature of the financial statements
and the audit report, assuming that the current valuations comprised the
balance sheet and the report testified to an enterprise's future success.
Understanding their historical nature was an important component in
becoming an informed investor. However, the profession needed the
Exchange's help in publicizing this perhaps because of a lack of funds or
a lack of access to the public. Whether the Exchange actually embarked
on a program of educating the public is unknown.
The profession's unwillingness to expand its responsibility for
accessing internal control and the detection of fraud was not unrealistic,
reflecting its knowledge that both were controlled by management. To
ensure either exceeded their ability. It would not be in the public's
interest to suggest otherwise. The AIA strongly preferred disclosure and
consistency of accounting method over uniformity for two reasons. They
believed that firms were unique and that corporate management could
best determine which methods most clearly reflected performance and
condition. Disclosure of methods should provide sufficient information
for the informed user. They also argued that, taken over time, differences
between accounting methods were unimportant if those methods were
consistently applied. Although the AIA only convinced the Exchange to
require a statement of consistency, at least they minimized a common
method of manipulating financial statements. The Exchange also
supported the AIA's opinion on significant issues, such as limiting the
practice of smoothing income by using surplus accounts to bypass the
income statement (see Appendix). In this way, the profession could
protect the investing public from significant and common
misrepresentations.
Conflict Theory Interpretation of Event 2
Collaboration with the NYSE benefitted the AIA considerably. First,
the formal association with the Exchange was prestigious. Second, the
NYSE's annual audit requirement granted a contract to accountants
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ensuring future income. Although the Exchange did not limit audits to
AIA members, it is likely that its relationship with the AIA bolstered
member firm's relative power in the accounting market, at least among
listed corporations. Third, recognizing VFS as the auditing standard
distinguished the AIA as the authoring institution. Fourth, despite the
rising profile of the AIA and auditing services, there was no increase in
auditor responsibilities beyond those supported by the NYSE and
therefore, no substantive change in the auditor-client relationship.
The public collaboration with the NYSE created a perception that
the profession was working to improve the financial reporting function.
However, little changed. The accounting principles agreed to were few,
and although 'few' in and of itself is not negative adjective, many of the
most controversial issues of the period including the treatment of
depreciation, bond discount and no par stock remained unsettled and no
mechanism for resolving these issues was put in place. Audits, though
required, still left major tasks optional and corporate management
retained the prerogative of preferability choices without disclosure. The
profession had raised its profile, potentially increased the market share
of major member firms, and appeared to be working in the public interest
while minimizing any expansion of its own responsibility.
Event 3: The SEC and the AIA 1934-1939
The years 1934-1939 were critical ones. It was possible that the
traditional practice of accountancy would not survive and the profession
had to work to maintain its identity. The Securities and Exchange
Commission, created in 1934, had absolute authority over accounting
matters. It could determine who could practice before it. It could set
accounting standards and could require auditors to take responsibility for
the choice of accounting methods.
SEC members, inexperienced but determined to put the Act into
operation, decided that the best approach was to work with existing
professional bodies. They solicited the profession's help in designing the
forms needed to satisfy the Act's regulations, in appointing suitable
commissioners, and encouraged them to set accounting standards. The
AIA was slow to act on the latter. Consequently, the SEC frequently and
publicly criticized the profession for the accounting treatments found in
submissions [Landis, 1936; Blough, 1937a]. Members [Landis, 1936;
Blough, 1937c; Mathews, 1937; Healy, 1938] threatened that the SEC
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might have to standardize accounting.6 They displayed irritation at the
profession's inability to monitor management, its unwillingness to take
responsibility for accounting presentations, and its repeated issuance of
uninformative or misleading audit reports. They complained that the
often-cited generally accepted accounting principles did not exist and
questioned the qualifications of some appearing before them [Blough,
1937a, 1937b, 1938; Werntz, 1939]. The SEC began issuing Accounting
Series Releases (ASR) in 1937, setting accounting rules for registrants.
The AIA fought these encroachments. It supported corporate
assertions that disclosure of sales, cost of sales, gross profit, and salaries
would give too much information to competitors. The AIA's Committee
on Cooperation with the SEC reproached the SEC for not accepting
these claims. Chairman Wellington argued that this information "might
be damaging to the company and therefore of injury to the stockholders"
[AIA Minutes, 1936, p. 53].
Despite its threats of standardization [Landis, 1936; Healy, 1938],
the agency eventually settled for consistency and disclosure of method
[Merino and Coe, 1978]. Curiously, the SEC did not mandate that a
statement of accounting policies appear in the annual reports to
shareholders. Although such a statement was required in the 10K, the
latter was not usually mailed to shareholders. Enforcing fair disclosure
of accounting methods therefore made no sense [Kaplan and Reaugh,
1939].
The SEC's ASRs #1-3 were not new accounting standards but rather
formalizations of the accounting rules written earlier by the AIA in
agreement with the NYSE (Coffey, 1976). In 1938, they issued ASR #4.
This stated that financial statements filed with them would be deemed
misleading if they lacked substantial authoritative support and left the
determination of authoritative support to the accounting profession. The
SEC adopted the role of endorser and enforcer of the AIA rules (Coffee,
1976, p. 220).
Regarding audit practice, the AIA issued Examination of Financial
Statements [1936]. It did not expand audit procedures over internal

6

"The impact of almost daily tilts with accountants, some of them called
leaders of their profession, often leaves little doubt that their loyalties to
management are stronger than their sense of responsibility to the investor.
Such an experience does not lead readily to acquiescence in the pleas recently
made by one of the leaders of the accounting profession that the form of
statement can be less rigidly controlled and left more largely to professional
responsibility
alone" (Landis, 1939).
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control, inventories or accounts receivable. Samuel Broad, Chairman of
the AIA Committee charged with revising VFS, said that VFS had been
criticized as "too mandatory in its presentation" a defect eliminated in
this document which emphasizedflexibilityand judgement [Broad, 1936,
p. 58-9]. The document reasserted the profession's position that
disclosure was a management prerogative and that the auditors would
only rarely issue qualified reports. The audit procedures, the extent of
disclosures and the accounting principles and practices set out in this
document were "only those which we believed were pretty generally
agreed to. . .we did not try to break new ground" [Broad, 1936, p. 5960].
The AIA remained committed to the short-form standard audit report
[Letter, 1935; Couchman, 1939]. The AIA Committee on Cooperation
with the SEC debated the wording extensively [AIA Minutes 1939, p.
166,170,172]. The Committee wanted a format acceptable to the SEC
which limited auditor responsibility. The Committee on Auditing
Procedure made only a few cautiously worded changes to the audit
report approved in 1939 (Kohler, 1941). The report minimized liability
more than it provided information to investors.
Why (did SEC abdicate its power? Some historians insist it did not.
McCraw [1982] is persuaded that the SEC was entirely successful in
negotiating substantive change on behalf of stockholders with both the
accounting profession and the NYSE. Coffee (1976) is slightly less
sanguine but overall remains confident that the results of the SEC and
AIA collaboration were successful. Others, more informed about
accounting, insist all changes were merely symbolic [Merino and
Neimark, 1987; Chatov, 1975].
One reason is that the AIA strengthened itself. Attacked by the
American Association of University Instructors in Accounting (AAUIA)
[see Kohler's scathing 1934 editorial] which, with the blessing of SEC
commissioner Robert Healy [1938], might have preempted the AIA in
setting accounting standards, the AIA decided to reassert its leadership
in this area. In 1936 the AIA completed a difficult merger with the rival
American. Society of Certified Public Accountants (AS CPA), a national
accounting body of about the same size thereby deflecting a potential
alliance between that group and the academics of the AAUIA. Now
larger, representing about a third of accountants nationwide, and with a
claim to expanded self-monitoring, the new AIA could act from strength.
They formed the Committee on Accounting Procedure in 1938 to study
and write accounting standards [Previts and Merino, 1979; Miranti,
1990]. Thus, the AIA acted in accordance with the agency's wishes.
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Another reason may have been that the political tide was shifting to
the right. Business found that it was again gaining power. The economy
appeared to be improving, if slowly, and the Supreme Court had declared
major New Deal legislation unconstitutional. All of business wanted to
avoid further government regulation. In this atmosphere, it may have
been expedient for the SEC to back off.
The ALA now represented a broader constituency and established a
standard-setting body. The SEC retained their declamatory speeches
keeping their real power as a constant threat. They continued to issue
stop orders if particularly egregious accounting presentations were filed
but, as of 1938, they left accounting matters to the accountants.
Functionalist Theory Interpretation of Event 3
The functionalist model predicts that professionals will actively
protect the public interest but does not require the existence of a formal
professional organization. The AIA, up until this point, trusted in the
professionalism of individual practitioners, attempting only to ensure that
they had been effectively educated and were experienced. Circumstances
forced the AIA to move the profession to another level. The SEC could
legally appropriate control over audit practice and accounting matters,
a possibility which threatened placing nonexperts in the position of
judging a complex discipline. To protect the public, it became necessary
for the AIA to convince the SEC that it was best to keep auditing and
accounting in the hands of professionals. To do so, it was imperative that
they be able to influence and monitor practitioners since the status quo
projected disunity and carried the stigma of competition. Unlike other
businesses, competition in a profession is viewed negatively, suggesting
that profits are more important than public interest. The merger with the
ASCAP doubled the AIA's membership and probably included most of
those who audited public companies. This gave the AIA the ability to
monitor those likely to appear before the SEC.
The profession believed that unique environments call for varied
accounting methods and that standardization across dissimilar industries
would be misleading at best. Consequently, the leadership first fought the
SEC's threats of regulation by arguing convincingly for consistency and
disclosure of methods, which the SEC soon required, as opposed to
uniformity.
The Securities Acts did not give power to the profession, but did
confer on it responsibility and substantial liability. If the profession were
to act in the public interest, it needed power. This it received, when the
SEC delegated that authority in ASR #4. With few exceptions, the
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agency has supported the AIA and the decisions of its successor bodies.
With this in hand, accountancy's governing bodies could seek consensus
on matters of general interest and this they tried to do by establishing the
Committee on Accounting Procedure. Though in hindsight this
Committee may not have been wholly effective (Previts and Merino,
1979, 269), its formation and purpose was in the public interest.
Conflict Theory Interpretation
The conflict model is also informative. The 1934 Securities Act
handed accountancy a market.7 The AIA wanted to monopolize it and it
did so by professionalizing its image. The merger strengthened the AIA's
negotiating position with the SEC. It now had influence over and
appeared able to monitor a substantial constituency. Although often
openly criticized by members of the SEC, the AIA turned some of the
criticisms to their advantage. They requested, and the SEC agreed
[Report, 1937], that questionable accounting questions and misleading
audit certificates be forwarded to them for comment and resolution. This
gave the AIA additional authority, bringing unsatisfactory reports of
both member and non-member audit firms under their jurisdiction.
The formation of the Committee on Accounting Procedure was a
unifying one. It included AIA members, ex-SEC commissioner Carmen
Blough, and members of the AAUIA who had frequently criticized the
AIA. The AIA thus eliminated by incorporation, its challengers to
accounting setting while creating a body too large to come to consensus
on controversial issues thus retaining many alternative practices (i.e
treatment of bond discount and of gains or losses on retirement of bonds)
and maintaining management freedom. They avoided proactive, positive
improvements in audit practice. Improvements were to come subsequent
to the embarrassment of McKesson-Robbins. No significant changes
appeared in the auditor's certificate. The AIA therefore negotiated a
successful relationship with the SEC, an agency that posed a definite
threat and in doing so increased its prestige and consolidated its power
without altering accounting, the audit function or the relationship of
auditors with corporate management.

7

It is possible that the audit requirement was added as a result of back

room lobbying [Miranti 1990].
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Postscript: McKesson Robbins Expands Audit Procedures
Until the McKesson Robbins fraud came to light in 1939, auditing
guidelines were ambiguous regarding receivables, inventories and
internal controls. Even sophisticated users were unaware that auditors
did not physically inspect inventories. Hoxsey, the Secretary of the
NYSE, was furious to learn that the auditors had used the "testing"
phrase to limit the scope of audit with respect to receivables and
inventories [Correspondence, 1939].
. . . it simply did not occur to me to doubt that inventories and
receivables were spot-checked to a sufficient degree to make the
auditors feel warranted in giving the financial statements
approval...I did not know that the statement 'but we did not
make a detailed audit of the transactions' covered such omission
[Correspondence, 2/22/39].
The McKesson Robbins case resulted in increasing auditor
responsibilities significantly. For the first time, a professional
pronouncement, "Extension of Audit Procedures" (adopted by the AIA
council on May 9, 1939) instructed auditors to go beyond the books
requiring inventory verification, accounts receivable confirmation and an
assessment of internal control.
CONCLUSIONS
Historical evidence can be interpreted in a variety of ways.
Motivation is not observable and formal statements may not be taken at
face value. Certainly an interpretation that assumes that all change is
evolutionary and that evolutionary change is progress towards the good
must be challenged. So it is with the development of the accounting
profession. One may interpret the adoption of a code of ethics, the
establishment of educational standards, the creation of a national
organization with power of self regulation as actions taken to promote
the public interest. At the same time, these actions do control the
profession, limit entry to it and secure high economic rents from so
doing.
There is no doubt that accounting and auditing are learned skills that
require the exercise of judgement. But the profession rarely articulated
what audit services were meant to accomplish stressing instead what
could not be done and repeating, rather unsatisfactorily, that audit
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judgements were nothing more than opinions. The AIA was not proactive
in setting audit standards for critical areas, resisted setting accounting
standards, declined to clarify the responsibility of the audit firm and
deferred to the desires of corporate management. Whether these choices
were made because the profession sincerely believed that the auditor's
professional judgement must always predominate over standards and
regulations to ensure reliable reports or whether they were chosen in
order to sustain the status quo in regards to relationships with corporate
management is a matter of interpretation.
Accountancy today is without doubt a profession, carrying with it
all the characteristics that one might choose to define a profession. It is
also true that accountancy faces similar criticisms to those it received in
the past. What is the auditor's responsibility? Has the auditor failed if a
firm collapses and he or she issued an unqualified report just before the
collapse? Are the battles to deflect liability attempts to avoid
responsibility or efforts to restore justice in an unjust system? Should the
accountant 'blow the whistle' or are quitting or issuing a qualified report
still the only options available? There is still some doubt about the
identity of the client. The responses to these questions made by the
profession, as similar responses were made in the past, will likely be
claimed by the profession as in the public interest and by critics as in the
interest of the profession itself. The truth, whatever it may be, is likely
to lie somewhere in between.

Published by eGrove, 1997

21

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 24 [1997], Iss. 2, Art. 4
86

The Accounting Historians Journal, December 1997

APPENDIX
Statement of Certain Accounting Principles Recommended by
Committee of American Institute of Accountants on Cooperation With
Stock Exchanges
1. Unrealized profit should not be credited to income account of the
corporation either directly or indirectly, through the medium of charging
against such unrealized profits amounts which would ordinarily fall to
be charged against income account. Profit is deemed to be realized when
a sale in the ordinary course of business is effected, unless the
circumstances are such that the collection of the sale price is not
reasonably assured. An exception to the general rule may be made in
respect of inventories in industries (such as the packing house industry)
in which owing to the impossibility of determining costs it is a trade
custom to take inventories at net selling prices which may exceed cost.
2. Capital surplus, however created, should not be used to relieve the
income account of the current or future years of charges which would
otherwise fall to be made there-against. This rule might be subject to the
exception that where, upon reorganization, a reorganized company would
be relieved of charges which would require to be made against income
if the existing corporation were continued, it might be regarded as
permissible to accomplish the same result without reorganization
provided the facts were as fully revealed to and the action as formally
approved by the shareholders as in reorganization.
3. Earned surplus of a subsidiary company created prior to
acquisition does not form a part of the consolidated earned surplus of the
parent company and subsidiaries; nor can any dividend declared out of
such surplus properly be credited to the income account of the parent
company.
4. While it is perhaps in some circumstances permissible to show
stock of a corporation held in its own treasury as an asset if adequately
disclosed, the dividends on stock so held should not be treated as a credit
to the income account of the company.
5. Notes or accounts receivable due from officers, employees, or
affiliated companies must be shown separately and not included under
a general heading such as Notes Receivable or Accounts Receivable.
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